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penditures and transferring the savings into activities which raise living standards. In order to smooth the path for such changes, the Executive Branch and the Congress should encourage long-range planning by defense-dependent communities and managements of defense firms and unions. This process should take place within the context of the Democratic Party's commitment to planned full employment.

Our civilian and military intelligence agencies should be structured to provide timely and accurate information and analysis of foreign affairs and military matters. Covert action must be used only in the most compelling cases where the national security of the U.S. is vitally involved; assassination must be prohibited. There should be full and thorough Congressional oversight of our intelligence agencies. The constitutional rights of American citizens can and must be fully protected, and intelligence abuses corrected, without endangering the confidentiality of properly classified intelligence or compromising the fundamental intelligence mission.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations

The United States and the Soviet Union are the only powers who, by rivalry or miscalculation, could bring general nuclear war upon our civilization. A principal goal must be the continued reduction of tension with the U.S.S.R. This can, however, only be accomplished by fidelity to our principles and interests and through business-like negotiations about specific issues, not by the bad bargains, dramatic posturing, and the stress on general declarations that have characterized the Nixon-Ford Administration's détente policy.

Soviet actions continue to pose severe threats to peace and stability in many parts of the world and to undermine support in the West for fruitful negotiations toward mutually beneficial agreements. The U.S.S.R. has undertaken a major military buildup over the last several years in its navy, in its strategic forces, and in its land forces stationed in Eastern Europe and Asia. It has sought one-sided advantages in negotiations, and has exerted political and military pressure in such areas as the Near East and Africa, not hesitating to dispatch to Angola its own advisors as well as the expeditionary forces of its clients.

The continued U.S.S.R. military dominance of many Eastern European countries remains a source of oppression for the peoples of those nations, an oppression we do not accept and to which we are morally opposed. Any attempt by the Soviet Union similarly to dominate other parts of Europe—such as Yugoslavia—would be an action posing a grave threat to peace. Eastern Europe will not truly be an area of stability until these countries regain their independence and become part of a large European framework.

Our task is to establish U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations on a stable basis, avoiding excesses of both hope and fear. Patience, a clear sense of our own priorities, and a willingness to negotiate specific firm agreements in areas of mutual interest can return balance to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, we should work toward: limitations on the international spread of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons; specific strategic arms limitation agreements which will increase the stability of the strategic balance and reduce the risk of nuclear war, emphasizing mutual reductions and limitations on future weapons deployment which most threaten the strategic balance because their characteristics indicate a potential first-strike use; a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests; mutual reduction with the Soviet Union and others, under assured safe-

guards, of our nuclear arsenals, leading ultimately to the elimination of such arsenals; mutual restrictions with the Soviet Union and others on sales or other transfers of arms to developing countries; and conventional arms agreements and mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

However, in the area of strategic arms limitations, the U.S. should accept only such agreements that would not overall limit the U.S. to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.

In the long-run, further development of more extensive economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union may bring significant benefit to both societies. The U.S.S.R. has sought, however, through unfair trade practices to dominate such strategic fields as merchant shipping. Rather than effectively resisting such efforts, the Nixon-Ford Administration has looked favorably on such steps as subsidizing U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade by giving the Soviet Union concessionary credits, promoting trade increases because of a short-run hope of using trade to modify political behavior, and even placing major United States energy investments in pawn to Soviet Union policy. Where bilateral trade arrangements with the U.S.S.R. are to our economic advantage, we should pursue them, but our watch-words would be tough bargaining and concrete economic, political or other benefits for the United States. We should also press the Soviet Union to take a greater share of responsibility in multilateral solutions to such problems as creating adequate world grain reserves.

Our stance on the issue of human rights and political liberties in the Soviet Union is important to American self-respect and our moral standing in the world. We should continually remind the Soviet Union, by word and conduct, of its commitments in Helsinki to the free flow of people and ideas and how offensive we and other free peoples find its violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As part of our programs of official, technical, trade, cultural and other exchanges with the U.S.S.R., we should press its leaders to open their society to a genuine interchange of people and ideas.

We must avoid assuming that the whole of American-Soviet relations is greater than the sum of its parts, that any agreement is superior to none, or that we can negotiate effectively as supplicants. We must realize that our firmness can help build respect for us and improve the long-run opportunities for mutually-beneficial concrete agreements. We must beware of the notion that Soviet-American relations are a seamless web in which concessions in one area will bring us benefits in others. By the same token, we must husband our resources to concentrate on what is most important to us. Détente must be military as well as political.

More fundamentally, we must recognize that the general character of our foreign policies will not and must not be set by our direct relationship with the Soviet Union. Our allies and friends must come first. Nor can the pursuit of our interests elsewhere in the world be dominated by concern for Soviet views. For example, American policy toward China should continue to be based on a desire for a steady improvement and broadening of relations, whatever the tenor and direction of Chinese-Soviet relations.

Above all, we must be open, honest, mature and patient with ourselves and with our allies. We must recognize that, in the long-run, an effective policy toward the Soviet Union can only be grounded on honest discussion, and on a national and, to some extent, an international consensus. Our own institutions, especially the Congress, must be consulted and must help formulate our policy. The governments of our allies and friends must

be made partners in our undertakings. Haste and secret bilateral executive arrangements in our dealings with the U.S.S.R. can only promote a mood of uncertainty and suspicion which undermines the public support essential to effective and stable international relations.

America in the world community

Many of the critical foreign policy issues we face require global approaches, but an effective international role for the United States also demands effective working with the special interests of specific foreign nations and regions. The touchstone of our policy must be our own interests, which in turn means that we should not seek or expect to control events everywhere. Indeed, intelligent pursuit of our objectives demands a realization that even where our interests are great and our involvement essential, we do not act alone, but in a world setting where others have interests and objectives as well.

We cannot give expression to our national values without continuing to play a strong role in the affairs of the United Nations and its agencies. Firm and positive advocacy of our positions is essential.

We should make a major effort at reforming and restructuring the U.N. systems. The intensity of interrelated problems is rapidly increasing, and it is likely that in the future, the issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of the military security problems that have dominated international relations since 1945.

The heat of debate at the General Assembly should not obscure the value of our supporting United Nations involvement in keeping the peace and in the increasingly complex technical and social problems—such as pollution, health, economic development and population growth—that challenge the world community. But we must let the world know that anti-American polemics is no substitute for sound policy and that the United Nations is weakened by harsh rhetoric from other countries or by blasphemous resolutions such as the one equating Zionism and racism.

A Democratic Administration should seek a fair, and comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty that will balance the interests of the developed and less developed countries.

Europe

The nations of Western Europe, together with Japan, are among our closest allies. Except for our closest neighbors in this hemisphere, it is in these regions where our interests are most strongly linked with those of other nations. At the same time, the growing economic and political strength of Europe and Japan creates areas of conflict and tension in a relationship both sides must keep close and healthy.

On the great economic issues—trade, energy, employment, international financial resources—we must work with the Europeans, the Japanese and other nations to serve our long-run mutual interests in stability and growth, and in the development of poorer nations.

The military security of Europe is fundamental to our own. To that end, NATO remains a vital commitment. We should retain in Europe a U.S. contribution to NATO forces so that they are sufficient to deter or defeat attack without premature resort to nuclear weapons. This does not exclude moderate reductions in manpower levels made possible by more efficiency, and it affirmatively requires a thorough reform and overhaul of NATO forces, plans and deployments. We encourage our European allies to increase their share of the contributions to NATO defense, both in terms of troops and hardware. By mutual agreement or through modernization, the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should be reduced, saving

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NO.

Acting Legislative Counsel

DATE 7 July 1976

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DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Director

Both the Democratic and Republican Party platforms are to be printed in the Congressional Record. The Democratic statement appeared on 1 July. I thought you might be interested in noting on the attached page from the Congressional Record the reference made to the U. S. Intelligence agencies by the Democratic Party.

Acting Legislative Counsel

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